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A Structural Analysis of Communal Forest Management in the 
Low-lying Areas of Lao PDR 
Tomoya MORI* 
 
This paper shows empirically how local communities in the low-lying areas of Lao PDR 
manage the common-pool resources of the communal forest. Previous studies showed 
that the local community participates in forest management. However, they did not 
address the question of whether local communities can appropriately manage 
communal forests. This question pertains to the management of common-pool resources. 
According to Ostrom (1990), common-pool resources are excessively appropriated, due 
to the negative externalities, and insufficiently managed, due to the free rider problem. 
This paper focuses on the institutions that local communities establish in efforts to 
prevent or mitigate these problems and on the communities’ social capital. According to 
Inoue (2009), Ostrom (2003), and Ostrom and Ahn (eds.) (2003), social capital plays a 
role in encouraging the members of local communities to contribute to the management 
of common-pool resources. In this paper, we use structural equation modeling (SEM) to 
analyze quantitatively the structure of communities’ social capital with regard to forest 
management. We reach three conclusions. First, villages have institutions to prevent 
the problem of forest overuse. Second, local resident do not always manage the 
communal forest well, due to the free rider problem, but if they create and maintain 
long-term social capital, they tend to manage the forest better than if they do not. Third, 
combining reciprocity with other social capital factors—trust and the social 
network—may mitigate the problem of overuse without the community having to 
establish a formal institution. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the role played by social capital in communal forest 
management in the low-lying areas (altitude of less than 400m) of Lao PDR. In these 
low-lying areas, villagers can gather some materials (e.g., firewood, food, and timber) 
from the communal forest. 
Forest land area in the low-lying areas of Lao PDR has been shrinking and 
deteriorating as a result of population growth and the influence of the market economy. 
This population growth consists of not only natural growth but also migration from 
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mountainous areas, because in the 1980s and 1990s the Lao government implemented 
policies to encourage the migration from mountainous areas to low-lying areas. In 
addition, after the Lao government adopted a market system, as part of chin tanakan 
may, some people voluntarily migrated to urban areas and suburban areas (e.g., the 
Vientiane capital, Vientiane province, and Bolikhamxay province). The market economy 
also has influenced land-use patterns: for example, people have converted forest land to 
agricultural land in order to cultivate cash crops and harvesting increasing volumes of 
material from the forests to sell at market). In addition, some companies have developed 
forestland and closed it off to local residents. 
Although residents of the mountainous areas mainly utilize forestland to produce some 
foods by a slash-and-burn technique, residents of low-lying areas take some materials 
(e.g., firewood, food, and timber) from the forest for life. Moreover, in the low-lying areas, 
as a source of water, flood control, and so on, the forest also plays a role in protecting 
residents’ lives. 
The Lao government’s forest policy permits local residents or organizations to use the 
land by allocating use rights to them (although the government retains property rights 
to the land, because Lao PDR is a socialist nation. The aim of the government’s forest 
policy is to utilize efficiently the lands and resources by delineating land boundaries and 
categorizing forests. 
In addition, the Lao government permits villagers to exercise the use right of 
communal forestry, based on the national land management authority No. 564 
“Adjudications Pertaining to Land Use and Occupation for Land Regulation and Titling,” 
enacted in 2007. Based on that forestry policy, the communal forest program issues to a 
village the right to appropriate and manage the communal forest on behalf of the 
villagers. For the purposes of this paper, we define the village’s management of the 
communal forest as community governance. 
Resources, such as a communal forest, that are appropriated by a community can be 
regarded as common-pool resources. Common-pool resources have as attributes 
non-exclusion and rivals. These attributes cause negative externalities for the 
community. In other words, common-pool resources are appropriated inefficiently and 
unsustainably (the problem of overuse). Furthermore, free riders benefit from the 
common-pool resources without having to participate in or contribute to their 
management. The existence of these free riders prevents the appropriators who 
co-manage the resources from improving the efficiency and sustainability of use even if 
they attempt to do so; this is the problem of undermanagement. 
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Most previous studies of communal forests were based on forestry sociology (Inoue, 
2000, 2003; Inoue and Hyakumura, 2000; Namura and Inoue, 1998). Specifically, they 
focused on the participation of local communities. They did not discuss the free rider 
problem or whether local residents participate in or contribute to the management of 
the communal forest and what problems they face if they participate. 
Inoue (2009), Ostrom (2003), and Ostrom and Ahn (eds.) (2003) mentioned that 
whether local residents participate in or contribute to the management of the communal 
forest depends on the social capital of the community. Previous studies mentioned that 
social capital represents social relationships and plays a role in restraining the 
emergence of free riders. Many studies have defined social capital, generally as being 
comprised of the societal factors trust, reciprocity, and social networks. However, few 
studies have quantitatively analyzed social capital. 
In this study, we use a common-pool approach to quantitatively analyze whether social 
capital in community governance restrains the emergence of free riders. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical data based on the 
author’s field research in the Sangthong district, Vientiane Capital. First, the 
institution that was established in order to manage the communal forest is described. 
Then, the analysis method—ANOVA, t-tests, and structural equation modeling 
(SEM)—is summarized. In section 3, the results of the analysis are presented. Section 4 
summarizes the results and their implications. 
 
2. Empirical Survey in the Sangthong district, Vientiane Capital 
2-1. Basic Information 
The Sangthong district is located approximately 60 km west of Vientiane capital, along 
the Mekong River (see Figure 1). This district is surrounded by mountains and includes 
Phou Phanang National Biodiversity Conservation Area (NBCA) as well as residential 
areas at altitude of less than 200 m. The district covers a land area of approximately 
800,000 ha and consists of approximately 40% agricultural land, 50% forestland, 6% 
wetland and 4% others. 
Migrants from other area, especially Luang Phanbang province, entered the 
Sangthong district in increasing amounts during 1995–2002 (Sayalath et al., 2011).  
The increasing migration inflow resulted in the conversion of forestland to agricultural 
land and the development of plantations such as rubber tree cultivation. Such 
development have encourage forests degraded and decreasing. Forest degradation and 
deforestation have led to disasters, such as soil erosion and landslides. 
Some villages in this district have obtained communal forest rights, supported by the 
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Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), the World Bank Gender and 
Development Group (GDG), and the (World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). This paper 
uses three villages in the Sangthong district (Napo, Kouay, and Houytom) as the field 
research sites. Napo and Kouay have already obtained communal forest rights, but 
Houytom has not. 
Figure 1: Site of Sangthong district 
 
Source: Author’s own construction based on data from MONRE and Google Earth. 
 
Table 1: Basic information of three villages 
Village name 
Items 
Population (Person) Household (HH) Nuai (Group) Area (ha) The Beginning of village 
Napo 476 97 10 2,591 1961 
Kouay 660 142 13 6,035 1897 
Houytom 577 111 8 2,100 1993 
Source: Author’s own construction based on Sayalath et al. (2011) and Mori (2015). 
 
Table 1 summarizes basic information about the three villages.1 The population of 
each of the villages is relatively small—only approximately 100 households and 
400–600 people. 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show that Houytom was established in 1993 and thus is a 
relatively new village. Furthermore, over 80% of Houytom’s households are migrants 
                                                   
1 Please see Sayalath et al. (2011) for information about the ages of the villages. 
Houytom’s age is estimated based on interviews. However, it is clear from interviews of 
the village elders that Napo and Kouay have longer histories than those villages’ strict 
ages. The estimates in Table 2 are based on when administrative villages were 
established in those locations, but some households lived in those locations earlier, 
when they were natural villages. 
 
Lao PDR 
Sangthong district 
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from other areas. In contrast, Kouay, has existed for more than 100 years. Kouay also 
has fewer migrant residents than do the other two villages. 
Table 2: Proportion of the forest 
Village 
Total Area (ha) 
Proportion of Forest 
Protection (ha) Conservation (ha) Production (ha) Burial (ha) Communal (ha) 
Napo 1,356.2 0.00 (0%) 1,122.40 (83%) 168.11 (12.3%) 14.77 (1.0%) 50.94 (3.7%) 
Kouay 2,434.11 670.00 (27.5%) 1,453.00 (59.7%) 168.11 (6.9%) 8.00 (0.3%) 135.00 (5.6%) 
Houytom 401.6 n.a n.a n.a n.a 3.5 (0.8%) 
Source: Author’s own construction based on Sayalath et al. (2011) about Napo and 
Kouay, field survey about Houytom. 
* However, in Houytom, the information about Protection, Conservation and Production forest is unclear because 
local people don’t have the information in detail and there are no their materials. 
 
Figure 2: Situation and reasons of the migrant in each village  
 
  
  
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey and Mori (2015). 
4 5 
10 
23 
20 
3 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
∼
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
∼
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
∼
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
∼
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
∼
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
∼
2
0
1
5
 
th
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
th
e
 m
ig
ra
n
ti
o
n
 
Napo 
28% 
1% 
67% 
4% 
Born in this village 
Invited 
Voluntary choice 
other 
0 
7 
12 
17 18 
1 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
∼
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
∼
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
∼
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
∼
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
∼
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
∼
2
0
1
5
 
th
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
th
e
 m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 
Kouay 
58% 
42% 
Born in this village 
Voluntary choice 
7 
2 
11 
27 
51 
8 
0 
20 
40 
60 
∼
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
∼
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
∼
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
∼
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
∼
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
∼
2
0
1
5
 
th
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
th
e
 m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 
Houytom 
13% 
1% 
1% 
85% 
Born in this village 
Required to join 
Invited 
Voluntary choice 
6 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of ethnic group 
 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey and Mori (2015). 
 
The ethnicity of the population of Napo is 74% Lao, 21% Khmu, 4% Hmong and 1% 
Phu noy. Kouay consists of 89% Lao, 3% Phu noy, 2% Khmu, 1% Thai dai, 1% Hmong, 
4% unanswered. Houytom consists of 78% Lao, 12% Khmu, 1% Phu noy and 9% 
unanswered. The Lao government categorizes ethnic groups into three broad groups 
based on altitude: Lao lum, Lao sung, and Lao Thong. 
In short, Napo and Houytom were established later than was Kouay and their 
populations include more migrants than does Kouay’s. This is especially true for the 
Khmu ethnic group, which generally lives in hillside areas. In contrast, Kouay has a 
longer history, has  a lower proportion of migrants, and consists of over 90% Lao. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of income per year in households 
 
 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey and Mori (2015). 
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Figure 4 reports the average annual household income for each of the three villages. 
Napo, contains the fewest low-income households. Houytom contains the most 
high-income households. Kouay has two groups of low income households and high 
income households. 
 
2-2. The Institutions That Manage the Communal Forest 
Studies by Terade (1993), Ostrom (1990), and Yabuta (2004) have described the 
institutions that manage communal forests. Those studies detailed the community 
governance of the common-pool resources by focusing on the boundary rule (which 
specifies the membership and the boundary of the resources), the allocation rule (which 
restricts the use of the resources), and monitoring and penalty rules (which monitor use 
of the resources and imposes penalties on rule breakers). In Laos, the boundary rule is 
defined by Land Forest Allocation Program. Therefore, this paper focuses on the 
allocation rule and the monitoring and penalty rules. 
All three of the villages studied can make and modify allocation, monitoring, and 
penalty rules in village meetings. The purpose of village meetings is not only to inform 
villagers of decisions made by the district’s administration but also to discuss village 
issues and reach agreement about potential solutions to them. Table 3 provides detail. 
Meeting topics are discussed by the village leader and deputies in advance of the 
meeting. In Napo and Houytom, Nuai’s leaders also participate in the advance 
discussion of topics. In a village meeting, if 60% of the meeting participants agrees with 
a proposal, it is passed. At least one person from each household must participate in the 
meeting. In Napo and Houytom, the first time a household misses a meeting without 
the permission of the village leader, it is cautioned; and the second time, the household 
must pay 30,000 kip.  Kouay does not impose such a penalty for missing village 
meetings. 
 
Table 3: Details of the village meeting  
Village 
Contents 
Frequent 
(times/month) 
Participators (person) Chairmans Decision 
Napo 2 
･least one person per a household. 
* If one doesn’t participate in the 
meeting, he has to pay 30,000 kip. 
･a village leader and deputy (three persons) 
･the topic in the meeting is discussed by a 
village leader,  deputy and Nuai’s leaders. 
･an agreement of 
60% participators 
Kouay 1 
･least one person per a household. 
* If one doesn’t participate in the 
･a village leader and deputy (three persons) 
･an agreement of 
60% participators 
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meeting, he doesn’t have to pay the 
penalty 
Houytom 1 
･least one person per a household. 
* If one doesn’t participate in the 
meeting, he has to pay 20,000kip. 
･a village leader and deputy (three persons) 
･the topic in the meeting is discussed by a village 
leader,  deputy and Nuai’s leaders. 
･an agreement of 
60% participators 
Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015). 
 
2-3. Analysis of the Institutions That Manage the Communal Forest 
Based on information obtained from the field survey, the allocation rules, monitoring 
rules, and penalty rules of the three villages have both similarities and differences. 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 report the details of each rule. The similarities are that villagers’ use 
of the communal forest is limited to house use, meaning that the villagers are 
prohibited from gathering materials from the communal forest for sale at market. The 
three villages limit the instrument for gathering forest materials to human labor. Napo 
and Houytom limit transportation of forest materials to human labor. In order to 
conserve forest resources, private roads and cultivation are prohibited in the communal 
forest. However, in Houytom and Kouay, one can do so, if agreement is obtained in a 
village meeting. Basically, a villager can appropriate non-timber forest products without 
agreement in a village meeting, but the villager cannot appropriate bamboo from a 
communal forest. This restriction on bamboo is limited to zones of degraded forest, 
specifically, the site of the SNV’s project in Kouay. In Napo and Houytom, in order to cut 
down trees in the communal forest, a villager must request and obtain approval from 
the village leader. On the other hand, during any season, a villager can use other 
resources from the communal forest, can graze livestock there, and can enter it. 
As shown in Table 4, Kouay’s allocation rule is less stringent than the allocation rules 
of the other two villages. According to Kouay’s village leader, its villagers do not 
compete for forest resources, because its communal forest is larger than those of the 
other two villages. In contrast, Houytom prohibits its villagers from cutting down any 
Afzelia Xylocarpa.2 
 
Table 4: Details of allocation rules 
 Village 
                                                   
2 Afzelia Xylocarpa is a southeast Asian tree that grows in Myanmar, Thailand, Lao 
PDR, Vietnam, and China. A hardwood, it is used in construction, including 
homebuilding. However, it is on the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s 
(IUCN) red list of threatened species. (http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/full/32811/0, 
last accessed on June 28, 2014) 
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Rules Napo Kouay Houytom 
Request of the 
appropriation  
If one cuts down tree of DBH over 
20cm, one has to request village leader 
and pay money;  
➢ 100,000kip (20-30cm per a tree.  
➢ 120,000kip (over 30cm per a tree. 
* The tree of DBH under 20cm is free 
until 5 trees. 
None 
If one cuts down tree, one has to 
request village leader.  
Use restricted Villagers can appropriate communal 
forest for only home use. If he 
appropriates it for sales, he has to pay 
the penalty. 
Villagers can appropriate communal 
forest for only home use. If he 
appropriates it for sales, he has to pay 
the penalty. 
Villagers can appropriate 
communal forest for only home 
use. If he appropriates it for sales, 
he has to pay the penalty. 
Trees prohibited to be cut 
down. 
None None Afzelia Xylocarpa 
Period and part  
permitted to be  
appropriated 
One must not appropriate a whole 
bamboo clump3 and bamboo in a year. 
One must not appropriate a whole 
bamboo clump and bamboo in a year in 
SNV project site, but can do in other site. 
･One must not appropriate a 
whole bamboo clump and bamboo 
in a year. 
Grazing prohibited None None None 
Cultivation prohibited Existence Existence Existence 
Opening the way in 
communal forest The prohibition 
If one can get the permission in village 
meeting, he can open the way. 
If one can get the permission in 
village meeting, he can open the 
way. 
Available seasons All seasons All seasons All seasons 
Entrance Village can enter anywhere. Village can enter anywhere. Village can enter anywhere 
Places restricted in 
communal forest 
Villagers must not appropriate in the 
place where the sustainable condition 
is bad.  
* SNV staffs judge the condition, but 
forest manager hopes to judge in 
future. 
* SNV staff remark trees as the sign in 
the restricted place. 
One must not appropriate a bamboo and 
cut down tree in a year in SNV project 
site, but can do in other site. 
Villagers must not appropriate in 
the place where the sustainable 
condition is bad.  
* Village leader judges the 
condition. 
 
Transportation restricted 
Villagers can carry by only manpower.  Villagers can carry by a track. 
Villagers can carry by only 
manpower. 
                                                   
3 Whole bamboo clump is the population composed of some clumps. 
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Instrument restricted Villagers can appropriate with only 
manpower. 
Villagers can appropriate with only 
manpower. 
Villagers can appropriate with 
only manpower. 
Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015). 
Table 5 shows the village leader, deputies, police group, soldier group or land manager 
that participate in the monitoring activity with the forest manager. The monitoring 
activity is not done frequently during the rainy season, because it is difficult to do so. 
 
Table 5: Details of a monitoring rule 
Village Contents 
 Forest manager 
(person) 
Monitoring member (person) Frequency 
Napo 2 Police group, solider group and forest manager (2). 
* If necessary, land manager participate in the monitoring. 
* Members in police group and solider group participate in a rotation. 
* Solider members have some arms in monitoring. 
One time per two months 
* There are some differences in each 
season; less in rainy season and more 
in dry season.  
Kouay 3 Police group (2), solider group (1), land manager (1) and forest manager (3). 
* If necessary, village leader and deputy participate in the monitoring. 
* Solider members have some arms in monitoring. 
One time per a month 
* There are some differences in each 
season; less in rainy season and more 
in dry season.  
Houytom 2 Village leader, Police group (11), solider group and forest manager (3). 
* If necessary, land managers participate in the monitoring. 
* Solider members have some arms in monitoring. 
* Members in solider group participate in a rotation. 
two times per one month 
* There are some differences in each 
season; less in rainy season and more 
in dry season.  
Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015). 
 
Table 6 lists each village’s prohibitions and penalties with regard to the gathering of 
bamboo and non-timber forest products for sale at market and cutting down trees for 
any purpose. Houytom prohibits cutting down one specific type of tree (Afzelia 
Xylocarpa). The rules in Kouay are less stringent than those in the other two villages. 
 
Table 6: Details of penalty rule 
Village The contents 
Napo 
･Rule breaker to cut down illegally must pay 2,000,000kip per tree in the case of tree of DBH 20-30cm, and 3,000,000kip per tree in the case of 
tree of DBH over 30cm.  
･If one appropriates bamboo in a year, one must pay 5,000kip per a bamboo. 
･If one appropriates bamboo roots for sales, one must pay 5,000kip per a bamboo root. 
11 
 
･If one clears trees or some resources for cultivation or the open of the way, one must pay the sum. 
･Rue breaker must be asked by other villagers in the village meeting. 
Kouay 
･If one appropriates bamboo in a year in SNV project site, one must pay 1,000kip per a bamboo. 
* Kouay has not decided the value of the penalty because rule breakers have not appeared ever. If they appear, the value will be decided in the 
village meeting. 
Houytom 
･Villager must not cut down illegally trees, but can appropriate freely non timber forest products. 
･Villagers must not cut down tree without the permission from village leader.  
Houytom has not decided the value of the penalty because rule breakers have not appeared ever. If they appear, the value will be decided in 
the village meeting. 
Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015). 
 
3. Quantitative Analysis 
3-1. Method 
In this study, questionnaires were collected from 335 households in the three villages. 
However, the factors of social capital (trust, reciprocity, and network) cannot be easily 
observed as variables. In order to incorporate such factors in a statistical model, latent 
variables are better than observed variables. Therefore, in this paper, we use structural 
equation modeling (SEM), a type of covariance structure analysis, to analyze the social 
capital factors. SEM is a methodology for deriving latent variables from observed 
variables and analyzing the correlations among the latent variables. 
Table 7 summarizes the three latent variables, the observed variables from which the 
latent variables are derived, and their components. The latent variables are created 
based on Linkert’s scale with five stages, from (1) very good to (5) very poor and from (1) 
very often to (5) never. 
 
Table 7: Latent and Observed Variables in this model 
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Source: Author’s own construction. 
 
Based on Ostrom’s studies (1998, 2003), we assume that trust and network enhance 
reciprocity and, therefore, that enhanced reciprocity encourages villagers to participate 
in collective actions. 4  Furthermore, we assume that the network and trust are 
interrelated. Namely, because a person is connected to other people, he or she trusts 
them, and because a person trusts other people, he or she is connected to them. 
See the model diagram shown in Figure 5. 
First, we assume that the latent variable for reciprocity ( ) enhances villagers’ level of 
participation. Then, we set the variables for communal forest management (  ), group 
work (  ), mutual aid (  ), ceremonial occasions (  ), and village meetings (  ) as 
describing the village’s collective actions and construct the latent variable for 
reciprocity from these variables. Second, we assume that the latent variable for the 
network (  ) is composed of the human relationships within a village and influences the 
villagers’ actions. We set the variable for acquaintances (  ), friendships (  ), and 
relatives (  ) and construct the latent variable for the network from these variables. 
Third, we assume that the latent variable for trust (  ) represents how a villager 
expects other villagers to cooperate with him or her. We set the variables for trust in 
insiders (  ), trust in outsiders (   ), and strength of relationships (   ) and construct 
the latent variable for trust from these variables. 
                                                   
4 Ostrom (1998, 2003) did not use the term network but rather used the term 
reputation. However, because the terms have similar meaning and scale, in this paper 
we treat reputation as the network. 
Latent variable Observed Variable Contents 
Reciprocity ( ) 
Communal Forest Management  ( 1) How often do you voluntarily participate in community forest management? 
Group Work ( 1) 
How often do you voluntarily participate in group work in this village? Please choose one in the following 
words.  
Mutual Aid ( 3) How often do you voluntarily participate in mutual help in this village?  
Ceremonial occasions ( 4) How often do you voluntarily participate in ceremonial occasions in this village? 
Village Meetings ( 5) How often are the meetings about community management held?  
Network ( 1) 
Acquaintances ( 6) How many persons outside this village do you interact with?  
Friendships ( 7) Do you often communicate with friends in village?  
Relatives ( 8) Do you often communicate with relatives in village?  
Trust ( 2) 
Trust for insider ( 9) How strong do you have trust for members in this village?  
Trust for outsider ( 10) How strong do you have trust for the people outside this village?  
Strength of relationships ( 11) Do you agree that the relationship in this village is good?  
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In addition, we define the variables                and   as error terms. The factor 
             is the correlation coefficient between    and of    , and the values of 
                 are fixed at 1 due to normalization. Finally, in this model there is 
assumed to be a covariance ( ) between trust and network. 
 
Figure 5: Path diagram of this model 
 
Source: Author’s own construction. 
The purpose of the SEM analysis is to determine the path and the degree of influence 
from trust and network to reciprocity. However, the history and social background 
varies among the three villages. Therefore, the differences among the villages, in terms 
of the observed variables, must be considered. So, we analyze the variables, both across 
villages and within each village, by use of ANOVA and t-testss. 
 
3-2. Results of the ANOVA and t-testss 
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the ANOVA and t-testss. The main effects of the 
differences across villages, in terms of observed variables related to reciprocity other 
than ceremonial occasions are clear. Kouay villagers are more likely than Napo or 
Houytom villagers to voluntarily participate in communal forest management. Kouay 
and Houytom villagers are more likely than Napo villagers to voluntarily participate in 
group work. Napo villagers are more likely than Kouay or Houytom villagers to 
voluntarily provide mutual aid and participate in village meetings. There is no 
significant difference between Houytom and Kouay in terms of participation in village 
meetings. However, Houytom villagers are more likely than Kouay villagers to 
voluntarily provide mutual aid. 
With regard to observed variables related to trust, the main effects of the differences 
across villages are as follows. Napo and Houytom villagers have more trust in insiders 
than do Kouay villagers. There is significant difference across the three villages in 
terms of trust in outsiders, with Houytom villagers trusting outsiders the most and 
Kouay villagers trusting outsiders the least. Napo villagers have stronger human 
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relationships than do Kouay or Houytom villagers. 
 
Table 8: Result of ANOVA for observed variables in each village 
items Village Vake SE F Items Village Vake SE F 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Napo 2.87 1.124 4.60** Group Work Napo 3.18 1.561 8.63*** 
Houytom 2.76 0.561 
 
Houytom 2.72 0.94 
 
Kouay 2.53 0.877 
 
Kouay 2.56 0.895 
 
Total 2.70 0.886 
 
Total 2.78 1.163 
 
Mutual Aid Napo 1.88 1.166 9.57*** Ceremonial 
occasions 
Napo 2.28 .100 1.51 
Houytom 2.19 0.741 
 
Houytom 2.20 .071 
 
Kouay 2.42 0.905 
 
Kouay 2.40 .083 
 
Total 2.19 0.966 
 
Total 2.30 .049 
 
Village Meetings Napo 1.8 0.571 29.87*** Acquaintances Napo 1.79 1.035 2.83* 
Houytom 2.34 0.742 
 
Houytom 1.71 0.911 
 
Kouay 2.5 0.739 
 
Kouay 1.47 1.261 
 
Total 2.25 0.753 
 
Total 1.64 1.103 
 
Friendships Napo 1.59 0.955 21.4*** Relatives Napo 1.27 0.638 20.36*** 
Houytom 1.96 0.719 
 
Houytom 1.55 0.739 
 
Kouay 2.33 0.884 
 
Kouay 1.93 0.906 
 
Total 2.00 0.906 
 
Total 1.62 0.828 
 
Trust for insider Napo 2.07 0.696 7.04*** Trust for outsider Napo 2.58 0.643 31.22*** 
Houytom 2.16 0.496 
 
Houytom 2.35 0.5 
 
Kouay 2.38 0.729 
 
Kouay 3.00 0.748 
 
Total 2.22 0.666 
 
Total 2.68 0.705 
 
Strength of 
relationships 
Napo 2.01 0.685 14.93*** 
     
Houytom 2.43 0.567 
      
Kouay 2.48 0.768 
   
SE: Standard Error, 
Total 2.33 0.714 
 
N=97～137 
 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey 
 
Table 9: Multiple comparison between three villages by HSD method 
  Village I Village J Difference (I-J) SE 
 
Village I Village J Difference (I-J) SE 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Napo Houytom 0.102 0.123 Group work Napo Houytom .456** 0.160 
Kouay .337** 0.117 Kouay .620*** 0.151 
Houytom Napo -0.102 0.123 Houytom Napo -.456** 0.16 
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Kouay .235* 0.114 Kouay 0.164 0.147 
Kouay Napo -.337** 0.117 Kouay Napo -.620*** 0.151 
Houytom -.235* 0.114 Houytom -0.164 0.147 
Mutual aid Napo Houytom -.311* 0.132 Village 
meetings 
Napo Houytom -.535*** 0.098 
Kouay -.547*** 0.125 Kouay -.700*** 0.092 
Houytom Napo .311* 0.132 Houytom Napo .535*** 0.098 
Kouay -0.236 0.122 Kouay -0.164 0.09 
Kouay Napo .547*** 0.125 Kouay Napo .700*** 0.092 
Houytom 0.236 0.122 Houytom 0.164 0.09 
Acquaintances Napo Houytom 0.081 0.154 Friendships Napo Houytom -.376*** 0.12 
Kouay .325* 0.146 Kouay -.741*** 0.114 
Houytom Napo -0.081 0.154 Houytom Napo .376*** 0.12 
Kouay 0.243 0.142 Kouay -.365*** 0.11 
Kouay Napo -.325* 0.146 Kouay Napo .741*** 0.114 
Houytom -0.243 0.142 Houytom .365*** 0.11 
Relatives Napo Houytom -.282** 0.109 Trust for 
insider 
Napo Houytom -0.085 0.092 
Kouay -.657*** 0.105 Kouay -.307* 0.087 
Houytom Napo .282** 0.109 Houytom Napo 0.085 0.092 
Kouay -.375* 0.101 Kouay -.222* 0.084 
Kouay Napo .657* 0.105 Kouay Napo .307* 0.087 
Houytom .375* 0.101 Houytom .222* 0.084 
Trust for outsider Napo Houytom .225* 0.091 Strength of 
relationships 
Napo Houytom -.416* 0.096 
Kouay -.423* 0.086 Kouay -.471* 0.091 
Houytom Napo -.225* 0.091 Houytom Napo .416* 0.096 
Kouay -.648* 0.084 Kouay -0.056 0.088 
Kouay Napo .423* 0.086 Kouay Napo .471* 0.091 
Houytom .648* 0.084 Houytom 0.056 0.088 
N=97～137 ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey 
 
The results also demonstrate the main effects of the differences across villages in 
terms of observed variables related to the social network. Kouay villagers communicate 
more frequently with other people than do Napo or Houytom villagers. The frequency of 
villagers’ communication with friends and relatives can be ranked, in descending order, 
as Kouay, Houytom, and Napo. 
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In summary, Napo and Houytom villagers provide more mutual aid, communicate 
more with their friends and relatives, and trust insiders more than do Kouay villagers. 
In contrast, Kouay villagers participate more in communal forest management than do 
Napo or Houytom villagers. In addition, Kouay villagers participate more in group work 
than do Napo villagers, although there is no significant difference in the group-work 
participation of Kouay villagers and Houytom villagers. 
Next, we show the results of the ANOVA of collective action in each village and a 
multiple comparison (using the Bonferri method) of collective action in each village. 
Figure 6 shows no significant differences across villagers with regard to factors related 
to collective action in Kouay. On the other hand, Napo and Houytom have the higher 
level of the mutual aid than the communal forest management and group work. 
However, there is no significant difference about the village meeting in Napo, and the 
village meeting and the ceremonial occasion in Houytom. 
Figure 6: Result of ANOVA about the collective action in each village  
   
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey 
 
Table 10: Multiple comparison of the collective action in Napo and Houytom by 
Bonferroni method 
Napo Houytom 
Collective action (I)  Collective action (J) Difference (I-J) SE Collective action (I)  Collective action (J) Difference (I-J) SE 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Group works -0.309 0.145 Communal Forest 
Management 
Group works 0.116 0.099 
Mutual aid .990*** 0.142 Mutual aid .653*** 0.09 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
.588*** 0.125 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
.632*** 0.081 
Village Meetings 1.062*** 0.128 Village Meetings .453*** 0.088 
Group work Communal Forest 
Management 
0.309 0.145 
Group work Communal Forest 
Management 
-0.116 0.099 
Mutual aid 1.299*** 0.168 Mutual aid .537*** 0.111 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
.897*** 0.144 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
.516*** 0.113 
2.87 
2.28 
1.88 
3.18 
1.8 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
Communal Forest 
Management  
Group Work  
Mutual Aid  
Ceremonial occasions  
Village Meetings 
N=97, F=38.58*** 
2.51 
2.4 
2.39 
2.57 
2.51 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
Communal Forest 
Management  
Group Work  
Mutual Aid 
Ceremonial occasions  
Village Meetings 
N=134, F=1.411 
2.36 
2.18 
2.16 
2.69 
2.81 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
Communal Forest 
Management  
Group Work  
Mutual Aid  
Ceremonial occasions  
Village Meetings 
N=106, F=17.76*** 
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Village Meeting 1.371*** 0.164 Village Meeting .337* 0.128 
Mutual aid Communal Forest 
Management 
-.990*** 0.142 
Mutual aid Communal Forest 
Management 
-.653*** 0.09 
Group works -1.299*** 0.168 Group works -.537*** 0.111 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
-.402** 0.119 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
-0.021 0.079 
Village Meeting 0.072 0.127 Village Meeting -0.2 0.099 
Ceremonial occasions Communal Forest 
Management 
-.588*** 0.125 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
Communal Forest 
Management 
-.632*** 0.081 
Group works -.897*** 0.144 Group works -.516* 0.113 
Mutual aid .402** 0.119 Mutual aid 0.021 0.079 
Village Meeting .474*** 0.101 Village Meeting -0.179 0.105 
Village Meetings Communal Forest 
Management 
-1.062*** 0.128 
Village Meetings Communal Forest 
Management 
-.453*** 0.088 
Group works -1.371*** 0.164 Group works -.337* 0.128 
Mutual aid -0.072 0.127 Mutual aid 0.2 0.099 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
-.474*** 0.101 
Ceremonial 
occasions 
0.179 0.105 
N=97 N=106 SE: Standard Error, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 10 shows differences between Napo and Houytom in terms of collective action 
and the social network. One reason may be the higher proportion of migrants and ethnic 
minorities (non-Lao people) in Napo and Houytom. 
Table 11 shows the cross tabulation of ethnic groups and reasons for being residents of 
the villages. In Napo, 35% of the Lao residents were born in Napo, 61% voluntarily 
migrated to Napo from elsewhere and 4% others. Most of the ethnic minority residents 
of Napo were invited or voluntarily migrated there. 
Table 12 shows that the population of Kouay includes fewer migrants and fewer 
people of Lao ethnicity than do the populations of Napo and Houytom. Of the Kouay 
villagers, 56% were born in Kouay, 41% voluntarily migrated to Kouay from elsewhere 
and 4% others. 
 
Table 11: Cross tabulation of ethic group and history of resident in Napo 
  Reasons Total 
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Born in this village Invited Voluntary choice Other 
Lao 35% (25) 0% (0) 61% (44) 4% (3) 100% (72) 
Hmong 0% (0) 0% (0) 75% (3) 25% (1) 100% (4) 
Khmu 0% (0) 5 (1%) 95% (19) 0% (0) 100% (20) 
Phu noy 0% (0) 0% (0) 1 (0%) 0% (0) 100% (1) 
Total 26% (25) 1% (1) 69% (67) 4% (4) 100%（97） 
1: Adding no answer all to other.        2: The number in parentheses is one of answers.  
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 12: Cross tabulation of ethic group and history of resident in Kouay 
 
Reasons 
Total 
Born in this village Voluntary choice Other 
Lao 56% (68) 41% (50) 3% (4) 100% (122) 
Hmong 0% (0) 100% (1) 0 (0%) 100% (1) 
Khmu 33% (1) 67% (2) 0% (0) 100% (3) 
Khmu 20% (1) 80% (4) 0% (0) 100% (5) 
Thai Dam 0% (0) 100% (1) 0% (0) 100% (1) 
Other 100% (5) 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (5) 
Total 55% (75) 42% (58) 3% (4) 100% (137) 
1: Adding no answer all to other.        2: The number in parentheses is one of answers. 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 13 shows that, of the Houytom villagers, 83% voluntarily migrated there from 
elsewhere, only 10% were born in Houytom and 6% others. As in Napo, most of the 
ethnic minority residents were invited or voluntarily migrated to Houytom. 
 
Table 13: Cross tabulation of ethic group and history of resident in Houytom 
  Reasons 
Total 
  Born in this village Required to join Invited Voluntary choice Other 
Lao 10% (9) 1% (1) 1% (1) 84% (73) 1% (1) 100% (87) 
Khmu 0% (0) 0% (0) 0 (0%) 85% (11) 0% (0) 100% (13) 
Phu noy 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (1) 0% (0) 100% (1) 
Other 20% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 70% (7) 0% (0) 100% (10) 
Total 10 %(11) 1% (1) 1% (1) 83% (92) 1% (1) 100% (111) 
1: Adding no answer all to other.        2: The number in parentheses is one of answers. 
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Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
The above results illustrate that Houytom’s population includes a larger proportion of 
migrants than do Napo and Kouay. In addition, the proportion of ethnic groups is large 
in Napo and Houytom. Moreover, in Napo and Houytom, the proportion of the migrated 
Lao group is larger than that of those born in each village.  
In the following, we analyze the differences between ethnic minorities and the Lao 
ethnic group and between the Lao group born in these villages and those who are 
voluntarily migrated to these villages. 
First, we find no significant difference between the Lao group and the Khmu group in 
terms of the observed variables in Table 14. In contrast, Table 15 shows a significant 
difference between the Lao group and the Hmong group. In Napo, members of the 
Hmong group provide more voluntary mutual aid and more frequently communicate 
with friends and relatives than do members of other ethnic groups. 
 
Table 14: t-tests between Lao group and Khmu group in Napo 
  
Value SE t 
  
Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Lao 2.88 1.125 .086 Group Work Lao 3.22 1.603 .305 
Khmu 2.90 1.252 
 
Khmu 3.10 1.518 
 
Mutual Aid Lao 1.92 1.264 .271 Ceremonial 
occasions 
Lao 2.31 1.083 .290 
Khmu 1.85 .875 
 
Khmu 2.25 .639 
 
Village Meetings Lao 1.81 .547 .305 Acquaintances Lao 1.73 .956 .555 
Khmu 1.85 .671   Khmu 1.90 1.252 
 
Friendships Lao 1.56 .948 .799 Relatives Lao 1.25 .599 -.314 
Khmu 1.75 1.020 
 
Khmu 1.30 .733   
Trust for insider Lao 2.07 .718 .172 Trust for 
outsider 
Lao 2.60 .643 .287 
Khmu 2.10 .641 
 
Khmu 2.55 .686 
 
Strength of 
relationships 
Lao 2.01 .682 .209 
 
 SE: Standard Error 
Khmu 2.05 .686   N=20～72  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 15: t-tests between Lao group and Hmong group in Napo 
 
Value SE t 
 
Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Lao 2.88 1.125 0.659 Group Work Lao 3.22 1.603 0.054 
Hmong 2.50 0.577 
 
Hmong 3.25 0.957 
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Mutual Aid Lao 1.92 1.264 2.291* Ceremonial 
occasions 
Lao 2.31 1.083 0.101 
Hmong 1.25 0.500 
 
Hmong 2.25 0.500 
 
Village Meetings Lao 1.81 0.547 1.084 Acquaintances Lao 1.73 0.956 0.532 
Hmong 1.50 0.577 
 
Hmong 2.00 1.414 
 
Friendships Lao 1.56 0.948 4.974*** Relatives Lao 1.25 0.599 3.540*** 
Hmong 1.00 0.00 
 
Hmong 1.00 0.00 
 
Trust for insider Lao 2.07 .718 .187 Trust for outsider Lao 2.60 .643 1.060 
Hmong 2.00 .816 
 
Hmong 2.25 .500 
 
Strength of 
relationships 
Lao 2.01 .682 .739 
   
 
Hmong 1.75 .957 
 
N=4～72 
  
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 16 shows significant differences in Kouay between members of the Lao group 
and members of the Khmu group in terms of participation in village meetings, 
communication with friends, and strength of relationships. Compared to members of 
the Lao group, members of the Khmu group in Kouay communicate more frequently 
with their friends but voluntarily participate less in ceremonial occasions and have 
weaker relationships. 
Table 17 shows that, compared to members of the Lao group, members of the Phu noy 
group in Kouay communicate with more frequently with other villagers and relatives 
but voluntarily participate less in group work. 
 
Table 16: t-tests between Lao group and Khmu group in Kouay 
  Value SE t     Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Lao 2.49 0.848 0.149 Group Work Lao 2.52 0.879 1.644 
Khmu 2.67 2.082   Khmu 1.67 1.155 
 
Mutual Aid Lao 2.42 0.889 0.803 Ceremonial 
occasions 
Lao 2.33 0.886 1.912* 
Khmu 2.00 1.00   Khmu 3.33 1.528 
 
Village Meetings Lao 2.52 0.741 1.184 Acquaintances Lao 1.43 1.205 0.678 
Khmu 2.00 1.00   Khmu 2.33 2.309 
 
Friendships Lao 2.32 0.855 17.041*** Relatives Lao 1.89 0.896 0.427 
Khmu 1.00 0.00   Khmu 1.67 1.155 
 
Trust for insider Lao 2.38 0.708 0.106 Trust for outsider Lao 2.99 0.71 0.02 
Khmu 2.33 0.577   Khmu 3.00 0.00   
Strength of Lao 2.44 0.761 8.089*** 
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relationships Khmu 3.00 0.00   N=3~122 
 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 17: t-tests between Lao group and Phu noy group in Kouay 
    Value SE t     Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Lao 2.49 0.848 1.458 Group Work Lao 2.52 0.879 1.690* 
Phu noy 2.80 0.447   Phu noy 3.20 1.095   
Mutual Aid Lao 2.42 0.889 0.044 Ceremonial 
occasions 
Lao 2.33 0.886 1.136 
Phu noy 2.40 0.894   Phu noy 2.80 1.483   
Village Meetings Lao 2.52 0.741 0.249 Acquaintances Lao 1.43 1.205 3.905*** 
Phu noy 2.60 0.548   Phu noy 1.00 0.00   
Friendships Lao 2.32 0.855 0.717 Relatives Lao 1.89 0.896 1.732* 
Phu noy 2.60 0.894   Phu noy 2.60 0.894   
Trust for insider Lao 2.38 0.708 0.07 Trust for 
outsider 
Lao 2.99 0.71 0.026 
Phu noy 2.40 0.894   Phu noy 3.00 0.00   
Strength of 
relationships 
Lao 2.44 0.761 1.689 
     Phu noy 2.80 0.447   N＝5~122 
 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 18 shows significant differences in Houytom between members of the Lao group 
and members of the Khmu group with regard to communal forest management, 
communication with insiders, trust in outsiders, and the strength of relationships. In 
Kouay, compared to members of the Lao group, members of the Khmu group 
communicate more with insiders, trust outsiders more, and have better relationships 
but voluntarily participate in communal forest management less. 
 
Table 18: t-tests between Lao group and Phu noy group in Houytom 
  Value SE t   Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Lao 2.73 0.586 1.876* Group work Lao 2.67 0.964 0.497 
Khmu 2.92 0.277 
 
Khmu 2.54 0.519 
 
Mutual Aid Lao 2.20 0.745 1.289 Ceremonial occasions Lao 2.21 0.753 0.904 
Khmu 1.92 0.641 
 
Khmu 2.00 0.739 
 
Village Meeting Lao 2.37 0.744 1.277 
    
Khmu 2.08 0.669 
 
 N=13～83         
Trust for insider Lao 1.75 0.909 2.640** Trust for insider Lao 2.16 0.457 1.116 
Khmu 1.31 0.48 
 
Khmu 2.00 0.447 
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Trust for insider Lao 1.93 0.72 0.778 Trust for outsider Lao 2.34 0.501 1.860* 
Khmu 1.77 0.439 
 
Khmu 2.11 0.333 
 
Relatives Lao 1.54 0.749 0.013 Strength of relationships Lao 2.46 0.569 3.595** 
Khmu 1.54 0.519 
 
Khmu 2.00 0.408 
 
N=13～85 
   
N=9～85 ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Next, we analyze the difference between Lao born in these villages and those who 
voluntarily migrated there. Table 19 shows significant differences in Napo with regard 
to communal forest management, group work, mutual aid, and communication with 
relatives. Compared to members of the Lao group who were born in Napo, members of 
the Lao group who voluntarily migrated to Napo voluntarily participate less in 
communal forest management and group work, provide less mutual aid, and 
communicate less frequently with their relatives. 
 
Table 19: t-tests for Lao group born in this village and one choosing voluntarily in Napo 
 
Value SE t 
 
Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Born in this village 2.28 0.98 3.340*** Group Work Born in this village 2.64 1.524 2.073** 
Voluntary choice 3.07 1.105   Voluntary choice 3.40 1.586 
 
Mutual Aid Born in this village 1.52 0.823 2.115* Ceremonial 
occasions 
Born in this village 2.16 0.746 -0.92 
Voluntary choice 2.00 1.279   Voluntary choice 2.34 1.081   
Village Meetings Born in this village 1.84 0.473 0.543 Acquaintances Born in this village 1.68 0.945 0.557 
Voluntary choice 1.78 0.573   Voluntary choice 1.82 1.094   
Friendships Born in this village 1.56 0.961 0.097 Relatives Born in this village 1.08 0.40 2.113*** 
Voluntary choice 1.58 0.972   Voluntary choice 1.33 0.705   
Trust for insider Born in this village 1.84 0.688 1.27 Trust for outsider Born in this village 2.60 0.645 0.117 
Voluntary choice 2.15 0.68   Voluntary choice 2.58 0.655   
Strength of 
relationships 
Born in this village 1.88 0.781 1.026 
     
Voluntary choice 2.06 0.649   N=25～67 
 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 20: t test for Lao group born in this village and one choosing voluntarily in Kouay 
 
Value SE t 
 
Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Born in this village 2.51 0.895 0.134 Group Work Born in this village 2.54 0.847 0.242 
Voluntary choice 2.53 0.883   Voluntary choice 2.58 0.963 
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Mutual Aid Born in this village 2.37 0.749 0.876 Ceremonial 
occasions 
Born in this village 2.39 0.884 0.779 
Voluntary choice 2.52 1.064   Voluntary choice 2.52 1.047   
Village Meetings Born in this village 2.52 0.742 0.289 Acquaintances Born in this village 1.60 1.424 1.27 
Voluntary choice 2.48 0.731   Voluntary choice 1.33 1.049   
Friendships Born in this village 2.33 0.890 0.075 Relatives Born in this village 1.85 0.917 1.041 
Voluntary choice 2.34 0.870   Voluntary choice 2.02 0.884   
Trust for insider Born in this village 2.43 0.738 0.506 Trust for outsider Born in this village 3.05 0.567 0.976 
Voluntary choice 2.36 0.718   Voluntary choice 2.93 0.814   
Strength of 
relationships 
Born in this village 2.56 0.758 1.094 
   
Voluntary choice 2.41 0.773   N=58～75 
 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
Table 20 shows no significant difference between natives of Kouay and migrants in the 
Lao group in Kouay. Table 21 shows significant differences between natives of Houytom 
and migrants in the Lao group in Houytom with regard to mutual aid, communication 
with friends and relatives, and trust in outsiders. Compared to natives of Houytom, 
members of the Lao group who voluntarily migrated voluntarily provide more mutual 
aid, voluntarily participate more in village meetings, more frequently communicate 
with their friends and relatives, and trust in outsiders more. 
The results of the ANOVA and the t-testss illustrate that the villages vary in terms of 
the social backgrounds of their populations. First, the degree of reciprocity differs across 
the three villages. The SEM analysis confirms this conclusion. Second, collective action 
and human relationships differ between ethnic groups and between members of the Lao 
ethnic group who were born in the village and those who migrated there from 
elsewhere. 
 
Table 21: t-tests for Lao group born in this village and one choosing voluntarily in 
Houytom 
 
Value SE t 
 
Value SE t 
Communal Forest 
Management 
Born in this village 2.56 0.527 1.241 Group Work Born in this village 2.5 0.527 0.762 
Voluntary choice 2.79 0.532   Voluntary choice 2.74 0.983 
 
Mutual Aid Born in this village 2.60 0.699 2.051** Ceremonial 
occasions 
Born in this village 2.18 0.405 0.277 
Voluntary choice 2.11 0.714   Voluntary choice 2.22 0.761 
 
Village Meetings Born in this village 3.00 0.816 3.005*** Acquaintances Born in this village 1.7 0.823 0.069 
Voluntary choice 2.29 0.694   Voluntary choice 1.72 0.941 
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Friendships Born in this village 2.55 0.688 2.964*** Relatives Born in this village 2.00 0.447 3.355*** 
Voluntary choice 1.89 0.694   Voluntary choice 1.48 0.738 
 
Trust for insider Born in this village 2.10 0.316 0.332 Trust for outsider Born in this village 2.70 0.483 2.478** 
Voluntary choice 2.16 0.517 
 
Voluntary choice 2.30 0.485   
Strength of 
relationships 
Born in this village 2.7 0.483 1.519    
Voluntary choice 2.41 0.579   N=10～90  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
3-3. Results of the SEM Analysis 
Table 22 shows the result of the SEM analysis. For this analysis, questionnaire data 
for which even one value is missing is eliminated, according to listwise deletion.5 The 
goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), the comparative 
fit index (CFI), the root mean square residual (RMR) and the root mean square error 
approximation (RMSEA) are used as fit indices in this model. The model’s fit is better if 
the values of GFI, AGFI, and CFI are near 1.00 and worse if the values of RMR and 
RMSEA are greater than 0.10. 
 
Table 22: Result of SEM 
  Napo Kouay Houytom 
  
Normalized 
Estimation Value 
SE 
Normalized 
Estimation Value 
SE 
Normalized 
Estimation Value 
SE 
Reciprocity (  ) ← Trust (  ) 0.209 0.175 0.345* 0.144 -0.253 0.235 
Reciprocity (  ) ← Network (  ) -0.079 0.226 0.643*** 0.233 0.558*** 0.114 
Trust (  ) ↔ Network (  ) 0.04 0.028 0.654*** 0.055 0.171 0.028 
Communal Forest Management (  ) ← Reciprocity (  ) 0.592*** 0.325 0.529*** 0.173 0.397** 0.302 
Group work (  ) ← Reciprocity (  ) 0.722*** 0.520 0.491*** 0.177 0.370** 0.043 
Mutual aid (  ) ← Reciprocity (  ) 0.490
† － 0.619† － 0.509† － 
Ceremonial occasions (  ) ← Reciprocity (  ) 0.690*** 0.317 0.473*** 0.207 0.837*** 0.672 
Village Meetings (  ) ← Reciprocity (  ) 0.195 0.120 0.508*** 0.162 -0.107 0.379 
Acquaintances (  ) ← Network (  ) 0.602*** 0.465 0.175* 0.180 0.723*** 0.151 
Friendships (  ) ← Network (  ) 0.627*** 0.467 0.798*** 0.177 0.829*** 0.111 
Relatives (  ) ← Network (  ) 0.639
† － 0.762† － 0.937† － 
Trust for insider (  ) ← Trust (  ) 0.707
† － 0.638† － 0.633† － 
Trust for outsider (  ) ← Trust (  ) 0.790*** 0.407 0.389*** 0.201 0.669* 0.578 
                                                   
5 For additional information regarding listwise deletion as a method for handling 
missing data, refer to Toyota (ed.) (2011), pp. 110-111. 
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Strength of relationships (  ) ← Trust (  ) 0.289*** 0.182 0.534*** 0.230 0.345* 0.319 
Fit Index 
GFI = 0.895, AGFI = 0.831, CFI = 
0.852, RMR = 0.082, RMSEA = 
0.079 
GFI = 0.833, AGFI = 0.892, CFI = 
0.826, RMR = 0.063, RMSEA = 
0.096 
GFI = 0.676, AGFI = 0.780, CFI = 
0.646, RMR = 0.06, RMSEA = 
0.162 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 and the coefficient with †is one when    .  
Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey. 
 
As shown in Table 25, the results for Napo and Kouay enable us to accept this paper’s 
hypothesis, although they do not agree in terms of GFI, AGFI, and CFI. In contrast, in 
the results for Houytom, especially the value of RMSEA being greater than 0.10, require 
us to reject this paper’s hypothesis. 
Figure 7 is the path diagram for Napo and Kouay. However, for Napo, although the 
correlations between the observed variables and the latent variables are significant, the 
differences in terms of the latent variables are not significant. In other words, although 
the three factors of social capital can be modeled as latent variables, there is no 
significant relationship among the factors of social capital. In contrast, for Kouay, the 
correlation coefficients between network and reciprocity and between network and trust 
are high, and the correlation coefficient between trust and reciprocity is low.6 
The relationship between each observed variable and the corresponding latent variable 
is statistically significant at the 10% level. For Kouay, these results show that the latent 
variables representing trust and the social network influence reciprocity, as was the 
hypothesis. The influence of the network on reciprocity is especially large. 
 
Figure 7: Path diagram in Napo and Kouay 
 
                                                   
6 The degree of correlation between two variables can be characterized as follows 
(Yonekawa and Yamazaki, 2010, p.77): 
           : High degree of correlation 
           : Medium degree of correlation 
           : Low degree of correlation 
           : No degree of correlation 
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Source: Author’s own construction. 
 
4. Final Remarks 
As discussed in sections 2-2 and 2-3 of this paper, the three villages have institutions 
such as those described by Terade (1993), Ostrom (1990), and Yabuta (2004), but the 
institutions vary across villages. For example, Kouay’s allocation rule and penalty rule 
are less stringent than those of Napo and Houytom. 
The results of the quantitative analysis can be summarized as follows. We have 
analyzed differences in collective action within and across villages. The results of the 
ANOVA show that Kouay villagers are more active in terms of participation in the 
village’s work, such as forest management and group work, and communicate more with 
insiders than do residents of the other two villages. However, Napo and Houytom 
villagers voluntarily provide more mutual aid to their friends and relatives than do 
Kouay villagers. The reason for the difference in terms of mutual aid (reciprocity) may 
be that Kouay has a longer history than do the other villages, and most of the Kouay 
villagers are members of the Lao ethnic group and were born in Kouay. In contrast, 
 
 
<Kouay> 
<Napo> 
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Napo and Houytom have shorter histories than does Kouay, and many of their residents 
are migrants from elsewhere. Because in the populations of Napo and Houytom include 
many migrants, a sufficient reciprocity norm does not exist and, therefore, cannot 
motivate collective action for forest management and group work. 
The ANOVA results are consistent with the SEM results. Although the SEM results for 
Houytom do not enable us to accept the hypothesis, the SEM results for Napo and 
Kouay are more fruitful. For Napo, the relationships among three factors of social 
capital are not statistically significant. However, for Kouay, trust and network influence 
reciprocity, as was hypothesized earlier in this paper. 
Based on the statistical analyses, we have demonstrated that in a village that has a 
relatively long history, social capital plays a role in restraining the emergence and 
existence of free riders. In contrast, in a village that has a relatively short history or has 
heterogeneous attributes (e.g., various ethnicities or migrants from other areas), social 
capital fails to play such a role. 
Although Kouay’s institutions are less stringent than those of the other two villages, 
reciprocity in Kouay is influenced positively by trust and the social network; thus, the 
reciprocity restrains the emergence of free rider. In other words, the combination of 
reciprocity and other factors of social capital encourages villagers to contribute to 
community governance without the need for a strict institution. 
This study has reached three conclusions. First, the three villages analyzed have 
established institutions, as described in previous studies of common-pool resources, to 
mitigate or even prevent the problem of overuse of the communal forest. Second, 
residents cannot always manage the communal forest well, due to the presence of free 
riders, but if they create and maintain long-term social capital, they can do so. Third, 
combining reciprocity with other factors of social capital may mitigate the problem of 
overuse without the community having to establish a strict institution. 
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